Federal Express Corporation v. Holowecki, No. 06-1322,
552 U.S. ____ (2008)
Decided February 27, 2008 | See opinion here
This case
involved the meaning of the term "charge" as it is used in the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).
Specifically, the ADEA provides that an employee must wait 60 days to
commence a civil action after filing a charge alleging unlawful discrimination
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). In April 2002, current and former FedEx
couriers over the age of 40 filed suit against FedEx, alleging that programs
tying the couriers' compensation and continued employment to certain performance
benchmarks violated the ADEA. FedEx
moved to dismiss, arguing that plaintiff Kennedy had not filed her charge with
the EEOC at least 60 days before filing her civil suit. Kennedy countered that she had filed a valid
charge in December 2001 by submitting an EEOC Form 283 "Intake Questionnaire"
and a detailed affidavit describing the alleged discriminatory employment
practices. The district court granted
the motion to dismiss, and the Second Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Justice
Kennedy wrote for the Court, which affirmed.
The Court held that, in addition to the information required by the
implementing regulations, in order for a filing to be deemed a "charge" under the
ADEA, the filing must be capable of being reasonably construed as a request for
the EEOC to take remedial action to protect an employee's rights or otherwise
to settle disputes between an employer and an employee. The Court accorded deference to the EEOC's
regulations under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. (1984) as reasonable constructions of the statutory term "charge," but
noted that the regulations fall short of a comprehensive definition. Applying the Skidmore v. Swift & Co.
(1944) standard that interpretive statements are entitled to a "measure of
respect," the Court accepted the request-to-act requirement that the EEOC had
adopted in internal directives over the years.
The Court agreed with the agency that the December 2001 filing was a
charge, noting that the affidavit included a request for the EEOC to "force
Federal Express to end their age discrimination plan" and that the plaintiff
had checked a box on the questionnaire consenting to the release of her
identity to her employer.
Justice
Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented.
He stated that a document merely describing the alleged discrimination
and the EEOC's assistance but not objectively manifesting an intent to initiate
enforcement proceedings' is not a "charge" under the ADEA. He asserted that a charge must request that
the agency take the particular form of remedial action that results from filing
a charge.
In
our view, the case will make it slightly easier, in some circumstances, for
plaintiffs to bring lawsuits under the ADEA.