Supreme Court Update


Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn, No. 06-1221,
552 U.S. ____ (2008)

Decided February 26, 2008 | See opinion here


The Court unanimously held that testimony by nonparties alleging discrimination by supervisors who were uninvolved in the contested employment decision is not subject to a per se rule of admissibility.  Plaintiff Mendelsohn, who was terminated by Sprint/United Management Company as part of an ongoing company-wide reduction in force, sued Sprint under the ADEA, alleging disparate treatment based on her age.  In support of her claim, she sought to introduce testimony by five other former Sprint employees alleging age discrimination by their supervisors, although that testimony did not involve the challenged employment decision.  In a minute order, the district court granted a motion in limine to exclude the testimony, stating that Mendelsohn could only offer evidence of discrimination against employees "similarly situated" to her.  The Tenth Circuit treated the minute order as the application of an improper per se rule that evidence from employees that have other supervisors is irrelevant to proving discrimination in an ADEA case.  Finding that the excluded evidence was relevant and not unduly prejudicial, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In a unanimous opinion by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded.  The Court ruled that the Tenth Circuit erred in concluding that the district court applied a per se rule, rather than remanding the case for clarification.  Emphasizing that district courts possess broad discretion in evidentiary matters, the Court stated that it is improper for an appellate court to presume that a district court reached an incorrect legal conclusion when the order is equally consistent with a properly stated rule.  Noting that relevance and prejudice determinations under Rules 401 and 403 are fact-specific inquiries that are not amenable to broad per se rules, the Court remanded the case to the district court to clarify the basis for its evidentiary ruling.

In our view, because of the way in which the Court disposed of the case, it will likely not have a great impact on the scope of allowable evidence in discrimination cases.